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Support to US Military Forces

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

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16 OCT 1984

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: []

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Deputy Director for Management and Operations
Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: NIE 7-84, The Outlook for Sudden Change in Key
Developing Countries

REFERENCE: Your memo of 4 October 1984, Support to US Military
Forces


1. Thank you for your memo of 4 October concerning NIE 7-84 and the strengthening of intelligence support to US military commanders.

2. Your interest, as that of your officers who discussed these questions with NIC officers here on 12 September, parallels the concerns of the DCI and the NFIB Principals -- who discussed these same needs at their recent Off-Site Conference. I am confident that these parallel interests will result in closer ties between our Estimates and the follow-ons to the Long Commission's recommendations.

3. I share your view that NIE 7-84's categorizations of unstable situations be updated every six months, via the IIM (or M/H) route, under NIO leadership, and will have the NIC proceed accordingly.

4. Our NIO point of contact is Hal Ford, telephone []

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Robert M. Gates
Chairman

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



4 OCT 1984

VO TSC 84-020

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Support to U.S. Military Forces (U)

1. (S/NF) On 12 September, my Deputy Charles L. Desaulniers and Special Adviser, Robert F. Thompson discussed at CIA with David McManus (NIO/W), Harold P. Ford (NIO At Large), and others, implementation of the Long Commission recommendation urging stronger intelligence support to U.S. military commanders. Mr. Desaulniers agreed at that time to forward to you some ideas on how the NIOs and the intelligence community could assist in this effort.

2. (S/NF) Enclosure 1 is a list of countries/regions "where U.S. involvement might occur over the next five years, which might include military support." It was developed by DoD, coordinated with CIA and State, and approved by a senior steering committee under the leadership of the DDCI, and the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, General Stilwell.

3. (U) The list is necessarily dynamic and needs to be kept current. To accomplish this, I suggest a process consisting of the following elements:

a. (S/NF) Use NIE 7-84, The Outlook for Sudden Changes in Key Developing Countries, as the basis for current evaluation of situations of incipient instability.

b. (S/NF) Rely on the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM) format and process, under NIO leadership, to provide necessary analysis between biannual issuances of NIE 7-84. For its part, the policy community could flag situations that might require U.S. Governmental action, including U.S. military involvement.

4. (S/NF) Obviously, any effort to provide better intelligence to U.S. military commanders must be tailored to identified and prioritized needs. An essential step, therefore, is to ensure that intelligence is effectively linked with policy so that prioritized guidance for intelligence collection and analysis is provided with adequate lead time. At our 12 September meeting, we outlined our thinking in paragraph 3 to Mr. Ford. We also surfaced it at the last HUMINT Committee meeting, and within Defense. We have surfaced the need for focused policy direction in a number of fora, especially Defense, and count on OSD to engage non-Defense elements of the policy community at the proper time and level.

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S/NF WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE**

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5. (U) We would be pleased to discuss our thinking further. The DIA action officer is

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FOR THE DIRECTOR:

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1 Enclosure
Countries Identified in Long
Commission Report, (TS/NF) 1 cy

cc:
VP w/enclosure

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SUBJECT: Improvements in HUMINT Support to U.S. Military Forces in Areas of Potential Conflict (U)

(TS/NF) Actions taken or in progress in response to the Long Commission recommendation on HUMINT collection activities:

a. A world-wide analysis has identified countries and regions where a significant level of instability may develop over the next 5 years.

b. From among these countries/regions, a list has been developed of those where U.S. involvement might occur over the next 5 years which might include military support. Such countries as the USSR and North Korea, which represent the overriding military threat and are the subject of continuing close scrutiny, are deliberately excluded:

Caribbean Islands
Cuba¹
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Iran/Iraq/Persian Gulf²
Israel/Syria
Lebanon
Nicaragua

Pakistan/Afghanistan³
Panama
Philippines
Somalia
Sudan/Egypt/Libya
Suriname
Thailand⁴
Zaire

¹Because Cuba is a Soviet client state it could be argued that Cuba belongs in the category of North Korea; however, various possible situations, e.g., interdicting another refugee exodus or limited blockade in support of actions in Central America, are contingencies of a lesser nature. Cuba is included because such possibilities exist.

²Includes Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman.

³While movement of Soviet forces from Afghanistan into Pakistan (Baluchistan, for example), would represent an overriding military threat, inclusion of Pakistan/Afghanistan on the list pertains to the possible involvement of U.S. forces, for example, to deter such movement.

⁴Thailand is included as a special situation in which Vietnam-Kampuchea hostilities may spill over into Thailand and result in a limited supporting or deterring U.S. military presence.

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